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Chin: The First Justice Harlan by the Numbers

THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN BY THE NUMBERS :
JUST HO W GREAT WAS “THE GREAT DISSENTER ?”
by
Gabriel J. Chin *

During the centennial year of Justice John Marshall Harlan’s most famous opinion,
the remarkable dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 1 an article in the Iowa Law Review2
suggested that Harlan was not a modern liberal on race issues. Rather than being a
Brennan or Marshall with muttonchop sideburns and button shoes, the article argued
that Harlan was a distinctly transitional figure, better than his brethren in some ways,
but afflicted with significant blind spots. In particular, Harlan criticized the Chinese in
his celebrated Plessy dissent itself. He contended that “[o]ur Constitution is colorblind”3 and insisted that government should guarantee “equality before the law of all
citizens of the United States, without regard to race.”4 But then he observed:
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it
to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few
exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But
by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with
white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the black race [cannot] . . . . 5

The article also noted that Harlan had voted against Chinese litigants in other important
cases.6 The point was not simply to trash Harlan, but to suggest that Harlan’s
reputation has been “whitewashed” by scholars and courts who ignored the
complexities of Harlan’s words and voting record.7 Specifically, while Harlan can be
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A., Wesleyan;
J.D., Michigan; LL.M., Yale. E-mail: gchin@aya.yale.edu. A version of this paper was
presented as the First Annual Charles R. Grant Lecture at the University of Akron, C. Blake
McDowell Law Center in February, 1999; the students and faculty present offered many
helpful suggestions for improvement. I am grateful for the comments and other assistance of
Taunya Banks, Sarah Chin, Bruce Ching, Paul Finkelman, James Gardner, Brian Heath, Donna
Nagy, Michael Solimine and Louise Weinberg.
1
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2
Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L.REV.
151 (1996).
3
163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4
Id. at 560.
5
Id. at 561.
6
See Chin, supra note 2, at 157-66.
7
See id. at 166-71. The article reported that the main constitutional law casebooks omitted
the troublesome portion of the Plessy opinion. As the article was going to press, a new
edition of one of those casebooks was published which included the language and a
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credited with being uniquely supportive of African American civil rights, he was not a
modern anti-racist because he did not object to racial discrimination against Chinese.
Although Harlan may be of substantial historical interest, neither supporters of
affirmative action like Laurence Tribe, Charles Lawrence, Cass Sunstein, and Kathleen
Sullivan nor opponents like Charles Fried, William Bennett, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy should invoke Harlan’s views as a contemporary
model for racial justice. 8
Harlan’s reputation does not seem to have suffered as a result of the critique.
Justice Harlan’s special authority continues to be invoked by state and federal courts,9
and Harlan himself remains the subject of intense scholarly attention.10 Of particular
note was one scholar’s suggestion that the argument was unfair to Justice Harlan.

discussion of its import. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M ICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS SUNSTEIN &
M ARK TUSHNET , CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114-15 (3d ed. 1996).
8
Chin, supra note 2, at 152-54 (citing sources where each named scholar or judge relies on
Plessy dissent).
9
One judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals invoked Harlan’s example in support of
his own decision to write separately: “It took 58 years to be persuasive, but his place in
history is secure. We know his name. Without looking it up, name me all the majority writers
in Plessy. Name me three? Name me one?” Granite Valley Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Jackpot
Junction Bingo and Casino, 559 N.W.2d 135, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). See also, e.g., Ho v.
San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 862 (9th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Virginia
Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 678 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing Plessy dissent in case
invalidating pay equity plan for female professors who were paid less as a group than male
professors); Coalition to Save our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 752, 780 (3d Cir.
1996) (Sarokin, J., dissenting); Quilter v. Voinovich, 981 F. Supp. 1032, 1055-56 (N.D. Ohio
1997) (three judge court), aff’d mem., 118 S. Ct. 1358 (1998); Price v. Short, 931 S.W.2d 677, 684
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Plessy dissent in support of proposition that race-based
peremptory challenges against members of any race were illegal; affirming judgment of judge
named John Marshall); Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376, 390-91 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)
(Randall, J., dissenting) (citing Plessy dissent in argument challenging Indian sovereignty),
aff’d, 561 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. 1997).
10
See, e.g., Molly Townes O’Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet: The Plessy
Dissenter’s Color-Blind Constitution, 6 W M. & M ARY BILL RTS . J. 753 (1998); Theolious
Johnson, Paradigms, Oxymorons and Color Blindness: Rethinking Black Entrepreneurship
in the Specter of Plessy, 26 CAP . U. L. REV. 301 (1997); Damon Keith, One Hundred Years after
Plessy v. Ferguson, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 853 (1997); Brook Thomas, Plessy v. Ferguson and the
Literary Imagination, 9 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 45 (1997); Mark Tushnet, Plessy v.
Ferguson in Libertarian Perspective, 16 L. & PHIL. 245 (1997). Books about Harlan also
continue to appear; for example, the University of North Carolina Press is soon to publish an
important new study authored by University of Cincinnati historian Linda Przybyszewski.
See LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC A CCORDING TO JOHN M ARSHALL HARLAN (1999); see
also Linda C.A. Przybyszewski, Mrs. John Marshall Harlan’s Memories: Hierarchies of
Gender and Race in the Household and the Polity, 18 LAW & SOC . INQUIRY 453 (1993).
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Professor Louise Weinberg, William B. Bates Chair for the Administration of Justice at
the University of Texas School of Law, writing in the Michigan Law Review, 11
demanded a closer analysis. In her essay, Holmes’ Failure, she argued that Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes was “a failure”12 in that he “became only a minor figure in the
intellectual history of the common law, and failed to become an actor in the unfolding
story of the common law itself. [With the exception of his First Amendment
jurisprudence], Holmes was almost wholly irrelevant.”13
Professor Weinberg perceptively and effectively criticized Holmes, but defended
Harlan. “I find little support,” she wrote, for the “argument that the first Justice
Harlan’s decency in civil rights cases did not extend to the civil rights of Chinese
Americans.”14 While acknowledging that “Justice Harlan apparently shared Chief
Justice Fuller’s view that the Chinese were ‘remaining strangers in the land, residing
apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to the customs and usages of their own
country, unfamiliar with our institutions and apparently incapable of assimilating with
our people . . . .’ United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 731 (1898) (Fuller,
C.J., joined by Harlan, J., dissenting),”15 Professor Weinberg insisted that “Harlan
struggled to secure the rights of Chinese immigrants. See, e.g., Chew Heong v. United
States, 112 U.S. 536, 560 (1884) (Harlan, J.) (interpreting the Chinese Exclusion Acts
as consistent with preexisting treaty obligations, thus enabling a Chinese laborer to
return to this country).”16
How can Professor Weinberg’s claim be answered? Citation of a single case in
which Harlan wrote for a majority in favor of an Asian litigant hardly suggests that
Harlan “struggled to secure the rights of Chinese immigrants.” After all, just as a
stopped clock is right twice a day, even at its worst, the Supreme Court did not reject
each and every claim advanced by racial minorities and other disfavored groups. But if
her citation of a single case does not end the issue, neither did citation of a small
number of cases; the article cited biased words written by Harlan, including some from
his Plessy dissent itself, but a few cracks alone, especially from the last century, are not
conclusive proof of bias. For example, if it could be shown that Harlan had used racial
slurs or engaged in stereotyping with respect to African Americans, that would not
undermine the fact that he was better than his colleagues on the Court; that he was not
perfect with respect to an issue does not mean he was not good. Implicitly, Professor
Weinberg asked for a defense of the article’s claims about Harlan’s jurisprudence which
more systematically accounted for Harlan’s voting record as a whole. This essay will
attempt to do that.
11

Louise Weinberg, Holmes’ Failure, 96 M ICH. L. REV. 691 (1997).
Id. at 692.
13
Id. at 722 (criticizing Chin, supra note 2).
14
Id. at 709 n.72.
15
Id.
16
Id.
12
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There may be no definitive scientific, quantifiable method of judicial evaluation.
Evaluation of a judge’s record necessarily involves a measure of subjectivity.
Nevertheless, even a subjective analysis can marshal and present evidence more
persuasively or less so. This essay proposes to defend the conclusion reached in the
Iowa article using three categories of evidence.
The first category of evidence, and one which the Iowa article totally ignored, is
Harlan’s voting record as a whole compared to the Court. It is difficult to draw
conclusions from a single case, even a singularly important case like Dred Scott or
Plessy. In any given ruling, any given judge may feel duty-bound to come out a
particular way, perhaps a way which is inconsistent with his or her personal political
beliefs. At the same time, it has been a truism since the days of the realists that within
the system of precedent many cases could be decided either way.17 Thus, it is relevant
to examine how Harlan voted in the broad run of cases dealing with civil rights claims
advanced by Asian litigants, and to compare that record to his votes in the civil rights
cases involving African Americans, where his reputation as a racial progressive was
earned.
The second kind of evidence that is relevant to the evaluation of Harlan’s judicial
record is evidence of intent or motive; statements of reasons for votes or attitudes. For
example, surely Harlan’s Plessy dissent would not be as celebrated as it is if it had been
based solely on an argument that the Court had no jurisdiction because the notice of
appeal had been filed out of time; the merit of his opinion rests on its advanced
understanding of the equal protection clause.
Finally, leading cases warrant special attention. An example is Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Plessy which was a vote that the Jim Crow system was unconstitutional.
Therefore, that vote might be regarded as much more significant than his vote in
Cumming v. Board of Education18 upholding a school district’s decision to offer high
school educations to whites only. By the time he wrote Cumming, Harlan’s antisegregation position had already lost in Plessy, and it is not entirely fair to criticize a
judge for applying a rule he was on record as opposing.19 On the other hand, twenty
votes holding schools or public facilities separate and unequal on the facts might not
outweigh a single vote in favor of the institution of separate but equal in the first place.
Considering these kinds of evidence together may offer an informed picture of a
judge’s disposition. By these measures, Harlan cannot be regarded as a defender of
17

See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687,
710-13 (1998).
18
175 U.S. 528 (1899).
19
Id. at 543-44 (noting that no challenge to segregation “was made in the pleadings . . .
[w]e must dispose of this case as it is presented by the record.”).
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Asian civil rights. Based on his voting record, he was the most ardent defender of
African American civil rights. By contrast, his record in Asian cases was one of the
worst. His votes in favor of African American civil rights were in critical cases. In
most of the critical cases with respect to Asian litigants, he voted against them.
I. COUNTING CASES: AN ARITHMETICAL ANALYSIS OF HARLAN’S SUPPORT FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS
In order to assess whether Harlan’s concern for civil rights extended to Asian
Americans, two groups of cases were assembled and examined.20 The first group
consists of cases decided during Harlan’s long service on the Court (1877-1911) which
involved statutory or constitutional civil rights claims by or on behalf of African
Americans.21 Typical examples of these cases involved African Americans who

20

Cases were identified by reading the results of three Westlaw searches. To obtain the
Asian American cases, the SCT-OLD database was searched using the following terms:
“date(aft 1876) and date(bef 1912) and Chinese or Japanese or Chinaman or Japan or China”.
To obtain the African American cases, the following searches were used: “Date(aft 1876) and
date(bef 1912) and ‘civil rights’ ”, and “Date(aft 1876) and date(bef 1912) and ‘Equal
Protection’ and ‘Fourteenth Amendment’ and African race Negro black”. The resulting lists
were checked against cases annotated in the West Supreme Court Digest, topic “Aliens,”
Key Numbers 19-38; topic “Civil Rights,” Key Numbers 1-17; and topic “Constitutional Law,”
Key Numbers 214-223. Any cases not produced in the Westlaw search were examined.
Finally, any cases not yet identified which were listed in a study of Justice David Brewer’s
voting patterns were read. See J. Gordon Hylton, The Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v.
Ferguson: Justice David Brewer and the Problem of Race, 61 M ISS. L.J. 315, 320-22 (1991).
21
See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (sustaining 13th Amendment claim); Franklin
v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910) (rejecting claim of racial discrimination in selection of
criminal grand jury); Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909) (rejecting due process claim);
United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909) (sustaining contempt charge against officials who
participated in lynching); United States v. Powell, 212 U.S. 564 (1909) (rejecting claim that civil
rights statutes applied to private conduct); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909) (rejecting
discriminatory jury selection claim); Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452 (1908) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to state statute); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908)
(rejecting challenge to state educational segregation statute); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S.
563 (1906) (upholding civil rights prosecution of state officials); Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1 (1906) (invalidating civil rights prosecution); Keen v. Keen, 201 U.S. 319 (1906)
(rejecting equal protection challenge to distribution of estate); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1
(1906) (invalidating removal based on allegation of discrimination in criminal prosecution);
Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906) (rejecting discriminatory jury selection claim); Riggins v.
United States, 199 U.S. 547 (1905) (sustaining prosecution under civil rights laws); Clyatt v.
United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905) (rejecting civil rights claim); Selden v. Montague, 194 U.S.
153 (1904) (rejecting voting claim); Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904) (rejecting voting
claim); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904) (sustaining discriminatory jury selection claim);
James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903) (rejecting civil rights claim; statute unconstitutional);
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claimed discrimination in selection of a criminal trial jury or grand jury,22 claimed
discrimination in their right to vote, 23 or were prosecuted for violation of a segregation
law.24 Other cases raised the question of the application or constitutionality of a civil
rights statute designed to protect African Americans.25
The second group involved claims advanced by Asian American litigants.26 Some of
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (rejecting voting claim); Brownfield v. South Carolina,
189 U.S. 426 (1903) (rejecting grand jury claim); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903)
(rejecting grand jury claim); Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900)
(rejecting challenge to conviction for violation of segregation law); Carter v. Texas,
177 U.S. 442 (1900) (sustaining discriminatory jury selection claim); Cumming v. Bd. of Educ.,
175 U.S. 528 (1899) (rejecting challenge to segregation conviction); Williams v. Mississippi,
170 U.S. 213 (1898) (rejecting grand jury discrimination claim); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (rejecting challenge to segregation conviction); Murray v. Louisiana,
163 U.S. 101 (1896) (rejecting grand jury claim); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896)
(rejecting jury selection claim); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896) (rejecting jury
selection claim); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895) (rejecting voting discrimination claim),
aff’g 69 F. 852 (4th Cir. 1895); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895) (rejecting equal
protection claim in criminal case); Wood v. Brush, 140 U.S. 278 (1891) (rejecting jury selection
claim); Louisville, N.O. & Texas Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890) (rejecting challenge
to segregation statute); Ex parte Yarborough (The Ku Klux Cases), 110 U.S. 651 (1884)
(sustaining constitutionality of civil rights laws); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
(invalidating civil rights statutes as unconstitutional); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883)
(sustaining jury selection challenge); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating
civil rights statutes); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (rejecting equal protection
challenge to criminal statute); Dubuclet v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 550 (1880) (rejecting voting
discrimination claim); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (sustaining jury selection
challenge); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (sustaining prosecution for violation of civil
rights laws); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (denying applicability of civil rights laws);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (upholding civil rights statute and claim of
discriminatory jury selection); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878) (invalidating state antidiscrimination statute).
22
See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (upholding claim of
discrimination in jury selection).
23
See, e.g., Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904) (rejecting voting claim).
24
See, e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (rejecting equal protection challenge to
criminal statute).
25
See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (holding that removal statute did not
apply to discrimination by actors other than the legislature).
26
See Goon Shung v. United States, 212 U.S. 566 (1909) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Liu
Hop Fong v. United States, 209 U.S. 453 (1908) (sustaining immigrant’s claim); Chin Yow v.
United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) (sustaining immigrant’s claim); Ah Sin v. Wittman,
198 U.S. 500 (1905) (rejecting discrimination claim by criminal defendant); United States v. Ju
Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161
(1904) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Tom Hong v. United States, 193 U.S. 517 (1904)
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them raised issues similar to the African American cases, such as discrimination in jury
selection,27 discriminatory enforcement of the law,28 or the applicability of civil rights
laws.29 However, many of these cases involved a category of claims which African
Americans rarely needed to consider: The constitutionality and interpretation of
immigration laws.30 While the interpretation of these laws does not necessarily raise the
question of race or discrimination directly, the cases are similar to the Jim Crow cases
in the following sense: most of the cases involve the interpretation of the Chinese
Exclusion Act and its progeny, a race-specific statute which was designed to limit nonwhite presence and influence in the United States.
The point of analyzing the two groups of cases is to develop a sense of the relative
sympathy of the justices to the respective claims of each group. It would be difficult or

(sustaining immigrant’s claim); Ah How v. United States, 193 U.S. 65 (1904) (rejecting
immigrant’s claim); Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (rejecting immigrant’s claim);
Chin Ying v. United States, 186 U.S. 202 (1902) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Chin Bak Kan v.
United States, 186 U.S. 193 (1902) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Lee Lung v. Patterson,
186 U.S. 168 (1902) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Lee Gon Yung v. United States, 185 U.S. 306
(1902) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Fok Young Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902)
(rejecting immigrant’s claim); United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902) (rejecting
immigrant’s claim); Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901) (rejecting immigrant’s claim);
United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459 (1900) (ruling in favor of immigrant); United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (sustaining 14th Amendment claim to citizenship by racial
Chinese born in the United States); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)
(sustaining due process claim by criminal defendant); Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
158 U.S. 538 (1895) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47 (1892)
(sustaining immigrant’s claim); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (rejecting
immigrant’s claim); Wan Shing v. United States, 140 U.S. 424 (1891) (rejecting immigrant’s
claim); Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); In re
Sibuya Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291 (1891) (rejecting claim of discriminatory jury selection); Chinese
Cases (No. 1), 140 U.S. 676 (1891) (dismissing immigrant’s claims on procedural grounds);
Chinese Cases (No. 2), 140 U.S. 676 (1891) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); United States v. Jung Ah
Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888) (sustaining immigrant’s claim); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678
(1887) (invalidating civil rights statute as unconstitutional); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) (sustaining claim of discriminatory prosecution); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703
(1885) (rejecting claim of discriminatory prosecution); Cheong Ah Moy v. United States,
113 U.S. 216 (1885) (rejecting immigrant’s claim); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536
(1884) (sustaining immigrant’s claim); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556 (1883) (rejecting
criminal defendant’s civil rights argument); Ex parte Hung Hang, 108 U.S. 552 (1883) (same).
27
See, e.g., Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U.S. 291 (1891).
28
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
29
See, e.g., Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
30
See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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impossible to decide which cases were “correctly” decided for our time or for then;
thus, there is no claim that any individual vote is right or wrong, justly motivated, or
biased. The lists of cases were intended to be as inclusive as reasonably possible
(although no claim is made that all of the cases which reasonably could be included
were identified). The lists include short per curiam dispositions, companion cases,
multiple decisions in the same case, and procedural dispositions. The lists exclude
interlocutory procedural orders, and cases which involved racial minorities as parties
but presented legal issues other than civil rights claims or immigration claims.
A. Harlan and African Americans
The Court decided 45 cases involving African American civil rights during Harlan’s
service; every one of the 28 justices with whom Harlan served on the Court voted in at
least one of those cases. In 11 of those 45 cases (24%), the Court sustained the civil
rights claim.31 As Appendix 1 shows (Appendices begin on page 648), Harlan’s votes
in favor of civil rights in 20 of the 44 cases in which he participated give him a pro-civil
rights percentage of about 45%, well above average, but not even in the top five overall.
Although these numbers may accurately reflect Harlan’s strong sympathy by
showing him to be almost twice as likely as the Court as a whole to support African
American civil rights, they may be misleading with respect to other justices because
they reflect the distorting influence of the fact that all of the other justices served on
only a subset of Harlan’s cases. Thus, Justice Hughes’ perfect record in favor of civil
rights, like Justice Jackson’s perfect record against, is based on a single vote in a single
case.
Appendix 2 reflects a slightly different analysis: each justice is ranked by the
percentage of votes they cast in favor of civil rights, whether as part of a majority or in
dissent, compared to how the majority voted in those cases. Justice Harlan is first by
this measure; he was 182% as likely to vote in favor of civil rights as his colleagues.
Justice Brown is a close second.
These results may be more probative than raw votes, because they show more
directly the extent to which particular justices deviated from the pack. Just over onehalf of the justices have scores of 100 because they voted no more and no less
favorably in the cases on which they sat than did the majority (every one of them
matched the Court by never dissenting, rather than dissenting for and against civil rights
in equal numbers of cases). This analysis probably should not be the last word because
it is questionable whether the honor of being the justice second most in favor of civil
31

Cases were counted as pro-civil rights if the individual Asian or African American
prevailed on their constitutional or statutory civil rights argument, if a segregation statute
was held unconstitutional, if a civil rights statute was held to be constitutional or applicable
to a particular situation, or if a civil rights prosecution was allowed to proceed.
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rights can go to Henry Billings Brown, the author of Plessy. This oddity is explained by
the fact that the 24 cases Brown sat on were generally not successful for the African
American litigants--about 10% won, compared to almost 25% for the cases as a whole.
Indeed, comparing Brown’s record to Harlan’s on those same 24 cases shows that
Harlan dissented in favor of civil rights five times to Brown’s two (as well as joining the
majority the three times it supported civil rights).
Appendix 3 looks at the data another way, ranking the justices by evaluating how
many of their votes were dissents in favor of civil rights. By this measure, Harlan is in
a class by himself; more than one out of five of his votes was a dissent in favor of civil
rights. He voted in favor of civil rights in nine cases in which the majority rejected the
claim.32
There were a total of 16 dissenting votes in favor of the civil rights position in this
body of cases; nine (56%) were Harlan’s. By contrast, of the 14 anti-civil rights
dissenting votes (i.e., dissents where the majority favored the civil rights position) none
were Harlan’s.
Appendix 4 analyzes the votes another way, comparing the frequency of dissents to
votes with the majority against civil rights. Harlan is first by this measure, also.
This analysis also shows that Justices Harlan, Bradley, Day, Brewer, and Brown
were, compared to the Court as a whole, more likely to vote for African American civil
rights than the Court as a whole, and that Harlan was the least likely, over the long run
of cases, to vote against civil rights.
B. Harlan and the Asian American Cases
32

See Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 455 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Court should hear involuntary servitude claim in spite of procedural objection); Berea College
v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that corporation or natural
person had right to offer integrated educational program); Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1, 20 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress had power to prohibit
violent interference with African American employment); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207,
222 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidence of transportation of African
Americans from Florida to Georgia to compel them to work was sufficient to present a jury
question of peonage); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 142 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting
without opinion); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903) (arguing that federal courts had
jurisdiction to order state officials to comply with Constitution and register eligible African
American voters); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that state segregation statute was unconstitutional); Louisville, N.O. & Texas Ry.
Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that railroad had
right to offer integrated services); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Congress had power to prohibit discrimination in public
accommodations).
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During Harlan’s tenure, the Court handed down 37 decisions involving Asian
American civil rights. Only 21 justices participated in the decisions. African American
litigants won 24% of their cases; Asian American litigants’ 10 wins gave them a slightly
better success rate of 27%. While no justice who voted in more than one case
supported African Americans more than one-half of the time, Appendix 5 shows that
Justices Peckham and Brewer consistently supported Asian litigants, voting in their
favor more than twice as often as the Court as a whole. Justice Harlan, by contrast,
was less likely to support Asian civil rights claims than the Court as a whole, ranking
13th out of 21 justices. He dissented in three cases, twice against and once in favor of
civil rights.33
Just as the raw percentages are not fully explanatory in the African American cases,
here also the wide range of percentages obscures that fact that most justices voted with
the majority most of the time. Appendix 6 ranks the justices in order of how likely they
were to vote in favor of civil rights compared to the majority in the cases in which they
participated. Appendix 6 shows that Peckham and Brewer’s high rankings in Appendix
5 were not anomalous; they supported civil rights for Asian Americans even in cases
when other justices did not. By contrast, Justice Harlan was somewhat less likely to
support civil rights for this group than the Court as a whole. Given the fact that most
justices voted with the majority, this puts Harlan fourth from the bottom.
Appendix 6 reflects that fully 14 of the 21 justices who voted in one or more Asian
American cases were neither more nor less supportive of civil rights than the Court as a
whole; that is, they had no net dissents in favor or against the civil rights position.
Appendix 7 examines how often a justice dissented in favor of civil rights compared
to their votes as a whole. For the top-ranked Justice Peckham, more than one out of
every two votes was a dissent in favor of Asian civil rights. Justice Harlan ranks 18th
out of 21 Justices.
Appendix 8 compares the number of dissents in favor of civil rights to the number
of votes with the majority rejecting a civil rights claim. Justice Peckham dissented in
favor of civil rights more then three times as often as he joined a decision against a civil
rights claim. Justice Harlan again ranked 18th out of 21 Justices.
C. Looking at the Numbers
33

See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898) (Fuller, J., joined by Harlan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that persons of Chinese descent born in the United States were not
citizens); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 635 (1888) (Harlan., J., dissenting)
(arguing that statute prohibited Chinese immigrant who lost his papers from entering the
United States); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 694 (1887) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that civil rights statute protecting Chinese was constitutional).
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The numbers suggest that Harlan was less sympathetic to Asian American civil
rights than the Court as a whole, and less sympathetic to Asian American civil rights
than he was to African American civil rights. Harlan was the clear champion of African
American civil rights on the Court. He joined every decision of the Court vindicating
African American civil rights, and dissented more frequently than any other justice
when the majority denied them.
With Asian American claims, he has one of the four worst records. Although the
Court as a whole ruled for Asian American litigants slightly more often than African
American litigants (27% versus 24%), Justice Harlan was almost twice as likely to vote
for the African American civil rights position than the Asian American (45% versus
25%).
The dissents also tell a stark tale. Because most justices voted with the majority in
every case, 34 dissents are significant. Harlan was responsible for more than one-half of
the dissenting votes in favor of African American civil rights-9 out of 16-and none of
the 14 votes against African American civil rights in cases where the majority held for
the individual. By contrast, Harlan was responsible for 25% of a smaller number (8) of
dissenting votes against Asian American civil rights, and only one of the 28 dissenting
votes in favor of Asian American civil rights.
Numerically, Justice Rufus Peckham is the anti-Harlan, strongly supporting Asians,
slightly less sympathetic than the Court as a whole to claims by African Americans.
However, there were justices who more systematically supported civil rights. Justices
Brewer and Day voted in favor of civil rights more often than the Court with respect to
both Asian Americans and African Americans.
There are, of course, alternative interpretations of the data. It is possible that the
Court which vindicated about a quarter of the claims advanced by each group was
wrong and Harlan was right, that the Asian cases were unworthy and the African
American cases were righteous. But with dozens of cases in each group, it is
reasonable to hypothesize that the idiosyncracies of individual cases would average out,
and that Harlan’s record-better than the court’s with respect to African Americans,
worse than the Court’s with respect to Asians-reflects an actual difference in
sympathies.
Further, it might be true that Harlan was a strong supporter of civil rights for
Chinese Americans, just as he was for African Americans, yet had a less favorable
record than the Court as a whole, if the Court as a whole was extremely favorably
34

Justices Blatchford, Hughes, Hunt, Jackson, Lamar, J., Lurton, Moody, Miller,
Matthews, Shiras, Strong, Swayne, VanDevanter and Woods joined the majority decision in
each case from both groups in which they participated.
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disposed to Chinese American civil rights, at least compared to African American civil
rights. However, the Court of the period is perceived by many as giving little respect to
Chinese American rights. In sum, the most reasonable interpretation of Harlan’s voting
record as a whole suggests that he did not support Asian American civil rights as
strongly as he supported those of African Americans.
II. EVALUATING CASES BY SIGNIFICANCE .
Part I concluded that Harlan was nearly twice as likely to vote for an African
American as an Asian American litigant, that no justice dissented more in favor of
African American litigants, yet only Justice Field dissented more against Asian
American litigants. However, that analysis did not look at the content of any particular
case; the reasons for any vote, or the impact of any decision Harlan joined or rejected.
Looking at Harlan’s votes in the context of specific cases will offer an additional piece
of evidence about the extent of his support for Chinese American civil rights.
Starting with Plessy, it is difficult to deny that Harlan’s comments about the Chinese,
“a race so different,” he said, “from our own,” strike the modern ear as racist.35
Certainly, Harlan was well aware of the discrimination imposed upon Chinese by the
national government; they could neither immigrate nor become citizens--disadvantages
imposed on no other race at that time. Harlan must also have known that this federal
discrimination perpetuated a system of disadvantage imposed by the states. Aliens
“ineligible to citizenship,” a category that was essentially limited to Asians,36 were
subject to various legal disabilities, such as prohibitions on entering licensed
professions 37 and owning real property.38
35

See supra notes 3-5, and accompanying text.
Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1998). For a description of
racial discrimination in American naturalization law, see Elizabeth Hull, Naturalization and
Denaturalization, in A SIAN A MERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 403-24 (Hyung-chan Kim
ed., 1992). See also GABRIEL J. CHIN, SUMI CHO, JERRY KANG & FRANK W U, BEYOND
SELF -INTEREST: ASIAN PACIFIC A MERICANS TOWARD A COMMUNITY OF JUSTICE 13-17 (1996)
(describing historical discrimination against Asian Americans), reprinted in 4 UCLA A SIAN
PAC .-A M. L.J. 129 (1999).
37
The leading cases on this point are In re Hong Yen Chang, 24 P. 156, 157 (Cal. 1890) and
In re Takuji Yamashita, 70 P. 482, 483 (Wash. 1902), in which the naturalization proceedings
undergone by Asian graduates of American law schools were deemed void because Asians
were racially ineligible for naturalization. See also Philip T. Nash, Asian-Americans and Their
Rights for Employment and Education, in A SIAN A MERICANS A ND THE SUPREME COURT ,
supra note 36, at 897-908 (discussing statutory discrimination against Asians in employment
and education).
38
See Thomas E. Stuen, Asian Americans and their Rights for Land Ownership, in ASIAN
A MERICANS A ND THE SUPREME COURT , supra note 36, at 603-30 (discussing statutory
prohibitions on Asian land ownership).
36
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However, Harlan’s reaction to disadvantages imposed on Chinese by law was not
that they should be invalidated according to his color-blindness principle. In this
respect, Harlan’s response failed to comport with modern arguments about the
anti-subordination purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, it did not even
satisfy the notion of simple formal equality. Instead, Harlan made what seems to have
been an early “underinclusiveness” argument similar to that found in modern equal
protection analysis: the law was irrational because it burdened one despised minority but
not another, and the one that was not burdened was even more worthy of segregation
from Caucasians.
Harlan’s vote in United States v. Wong Kim Ark 39 was potentially the most damaging
to the Chinese and other immigrants. In that case, the Justice Department
unsuccessfully tested its theory that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment40 did not apply to persons of Chinese racial ancestry born in the United
States. Wong Kim Ark, a native San Franciscan, was refused admission to the United
States upon his return from an overseas visit on the ground that he was not a citizen,
and could not be admitted as an immigrant because of the Chinese Exclusion Act.41
While the majority held that Wong Kim Ark was a citizen, Harlan agreed with the
Solicitor General that Chinese could not become citizens simply by being born in the
United States and that because Chinese were racially ineligible for naturalization,42 there
were no circumstances under which people with Chinese blood could become
Americans.
The Justice Department appealed explicitly to race, in addition to legal technicalities:
For the most persuasive reasons we have refused citizenship to Chinese subjects;
and yet, as to their offspring, who are just as obnoxious, and to whom the same
reasons for exclusion apply with equal force, we are told that we must accept them
as fellow-citizens, and that, too, because of the mere accident of birth. There
certainly should be some honor and dignity in American citizenship that would be
sacred from the foul and corrupting taint of a debasing alienage. Are Chinese
children born in this country to share with the descendants of the patriots of the
American Revolution the exalted qualification of being eligible to the Presidency of
the nation, conferred by the Constitution in recognition of the importance and
39

169 U.S. 649 (1898).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein
they reside.”).
41
Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of
1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
42
Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (limiting naturalization to “free white persons”),
amended by Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (extending naturalization privileges
to persons of African descent).
40
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dignity of citizenship by birth? If so, then verily there has been a most degenerate
departure from the patriotic ideals of our forefathers; and surely in that case
American citizenship is not worth having.43

In this case, Justice Harlan should have joined the majority. In Plessy, he wrote: “[T]he
recent amendments of the supreme law . . . established universal civil freedom, gave
citizenship to all born or naturalized in the United States, and residing here, [and]
obliterated the race line from our systems of governments.”44 Instead, Harlan joined the
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Fuller, who concluded that Chinese “cannot become
citizens nor acquire a permanent home here, no matter what the length of their stay may
be.”45
Harlan and Fuller relied on racial characterizations of the Chinese, warning of “the
presence within our territory of large numbers of Chinese laborers, of a distinct race
and religion, remaining strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, tenaciously
adhering to the customs and usages of their own country, unfamiliar with our
institutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people.”46 “It is not to be
admitted,” concluded Harlan and Fuller, “that the children of persons so situated
become citizens by accident of birth.”47
Harlan joined many decisions of the Court supporting the power of the United States
to exclude members of particular races because of their perceived defects. In Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 48 the Court upheld a ban on Chinese immigration. The
Court explained that the Chinese “remained strangers in the land, residing apart by
themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed
impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or to make any changes in their
habits or modes of living.”49 Therefore, exclusion of the Chinese was appropriate:
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and
encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all
other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such
aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its
national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. . . . If,
43

See Brief for the United States at 34, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
(No. 95-904), reprinted in 14 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND A RGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT : CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 37 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
44
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Elk v.
Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 110 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that citizenship clause applies
to Native American who has severed connections with tribe).
45
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 731 (Fuller, C.J., joined by Harlan, J., dissenting).
46
Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 717 (1893)).
47
Id.
48
130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
49
Id. at 595.
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therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative department,
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not
assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to
be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which
the foreigners are subjects.50

Harlan did not participate in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 51 where a majority of the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute providing that any Chinese person in the
United States was presumed to be unlawfully present unless he or she could prove
lawful presence with a federal registration certificate. 52 During this period, no other
aliens were required to register or otherwise prove lawful presence. 53 However,
Harlan’s frequent citation of Fong Yue Ting betrayed no lack of sympathy for its
reasoning or result.54
Harlan is justly famous for his perceptive appreciation of the situation of African
Americans and the intent and effect of the laws aimed at them. His due process
jurisprudence with respect to Chinese immigrants does not necessarily betray direct
racism, but it does suggest a wholly different level of sympathy. In The Japanese
Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher),55 a would-be Japanese immigrant in exclusion
proceedings 56 claimed that she had been denied due process by the immigration
authorities. Harlan agreed that even in immigration proceedings the government could

50

Id. at 606.
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
52
See id. at 728-32. Harlan was in Paris when Fong Yue Ting was argued. See id. at 698
(noting that case was argued on May 10, 1893); 149 U.S. iii n.1 (“Mr. Justice Harlan, having
been appointed an Arbitrator on the part of the United States in the Behring Sea Fur-Seal
arbitration in Paris, heard argument for the last time, this term, on Monday, December 5, 1892,
and left for Paris soon after.”).
53
The United States imposed a general registration requirement on all resident aliens only
in 1940. See Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (June 28, 1940).
54
Justice Harlan relied most plainly on the merits of Fong Yue Ting in his opinions in
Yamataya v. Fisher and Lem Moon Sing. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97, 100-01
(1902) (Harlan, J.) (relying on Fong Yue Ting for principle that race-based exclusion is
constitutional, and that judicial review of executive action may be sharply curtailed); Lem
Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 544-46 (1894) (Harlan, J.) (discussing Fong Yue
Ting at length with approval); see also La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S.
423, 460 (1889) (Harlan, J.) (citing Fong Yue Ting); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 488 (1894)
(Harlan, J.) (citing Fong Yue Ting).
55
189 U.S. 86 (1902).
56
The case was heard in 1903; it took the United States another four years to impose a
blanket exclusion of Japanese through the so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement.” See BILL ONG
HING, M AKING AND REMAKING A SIAN A MERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850-1990, at
207-12 (1993) (reprinting portions of Gentlemen’s Agreement).
51
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not “disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law.’ ”57 Part
of due process was an “opportunity, at some time, to be heard.”58 Astonishingly, the
fact that the proceeding was conducted in English, a language unfamiliar to the
defendant, did not strike Harlan as a constitutional infirmity.
If the appellant’s want of knowledge of the English language put her at some
disadvantage in the investigation conducted by that officer, that was her misfortune, and
constitutes no reason, under the acts of Congress, or under any rule of law, for the
intervention of the court by habeas corpus. We perceive no ground for such
intervention,-none for the contention that due process of law was denied to appellant.59

Of course, modern courts do not agree that a hearing in an unfamiliar language satisfies
the requirements of due process of law.60
In United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 61 Harlan used his rhetorical powers to criticize the
majority’s interpretation of a statute that required Chinese residents of the United States
to produce a government certificate authorizing re-entry after a foreign visit. Because
Jung Ah Lung’s certificate had been stolen, the majority held that other government
records could be examined to establish his identity and right to enter.62 Harlan
disagreed, concluding that only the certificate itself was suffic ient evidence under the
statute: “If appellee’s certificate was forcibly taken from him by a band of pirates . . .
that is his misfortune. That fact ought not to defeat what was manifestly the intention
of the legislative branch of the Government.”63 It is difficult to reconcile this hardhearted dissent with the humanitarian evident in portions of the Plessy dissent.
Harlan may have believed that the Chinese were racially unsuited to live in the United
States. One piece of evidence-admittedly inconclusive-is the draft argument Harlan
wrote for his son, James, who was preparing for a debate at Princeton.64 The father
wrote:
[W]e are not bound, upon any broad principle of humanity, to harm our
own country in order to benefit the Chinese who may arrive here.... Now, if
by introduction of Chinese labor we [jeopardize] our own laborers, why not
57

Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100.
Id. at 101.
59
Id. at 102.
60
See, e.g., STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 66 (2d ed. 1997);
THOMAS A. A LEINIKOFF, DAVID M ARTIN & HIROSHI M OTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 797 (4th
ed. 1998).
61
124 U.S. 621 (1888).
62
See id. at 634-35.
63
Id. at 639 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64
See Letter from Justice Harlan to his son, James (Jan. 21, 1883) (unpublished manuscript, available
in John Marshall Harlan Papers, Library of Congress).
58
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restrict immigration of Chinese. The Chinese are of a different race, as
distinct from ours as ours is from the negro.... [S]uppose there was a tide of
immigration ... of uneducated African savages-would we not restrict their
coming? Would we desist because they are human beings & upon the idea
that they have a right to better their condition? ... [Chinese] will not
assimilate to our people. If they come, we must admit them to citizenship,
then to suffrage--what would become of the country in such a
contingency.... Under the ten year statute [i.e., the first Chinese Exclusion
Act] we have an opportunity to test the question whether it is safe to let
down the bars and permit unrestricted immigration-The Chinese here will,
in that time, show of what stuff they are made. Our policy is to keep this
country, distinctively, under American influence. Only Americans, or
those who become such by long stay here, understand American
institutions.65

Conceivably, Harlan’s transcendence in Plessy and failure in the Asian American
cases can be explained by the nature of the cases. Most of the Asian American cases
involved an exercise of power by the national government over immigration; most of
the African American cases involved state laws or state action. Of course, the
Fourteenth Amendment by its terms applies only to the states, and there is no equal
protection clause in the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, Harlan might have reasoned
that the equal protection clause, and its rationale, bound the states but did not limit
federal power. If this explanation is true, then the dissent’s status as an honored text is
undeserved. It means that Harlan’s insight was not prejudice, but preemption; if there
were discrimination to be done, then the federal government, with its much broader
powers would do it, not the states.
This explanation is refuted by the language of the Plessy dissent. The dissent does
not focus on the special obligations of states, or the constitutional limitations imposed
upon them. Instead, he seems to argue that denial to African Americas of equal
treatment is wrong. But if Harlan is entitled to credit for voting against segregation in
Plessy because segregation was wrong, it remains a mystery why his antidiscrimination principle was not uniformly applicable.
Perhaps Harlan’s sympathy for African Americans and lack of sympathy for Asian
Americans is explained by pragmatic distinctions drawn between Asians and African
Americans by Congressional opponents of Chinese immigration. They argued, in
essence, that African Americans had to be provided for because they were here. By
contrast, the Asian problem was still avoidable. 66 If this explanation is true, then
Harlan’s reputation is again undeserved. This is a weak rationale for equal treatment
which, even if it had been accepted, would have offered little protection to African
Americans and none to anyone else. It would hardly have been a model for enlightened
65
66

Id.
See Chin, supra note 36, at 33-36.
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contemporary jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Justice Harlan’s voting record is revealing and points in the same direction as other
evidence of his attitude toward Asian Americans. In the broad run of cases, the Great
Dissenter was less likely to vote for As ian American litigants than the Court as a whole,
and much less likely to do so than he was for African Americans. Harlan’s negative
votes in the Asian American cases involved critical civil rights issues. And to the extent
that reasons for Harlan’s votes can be discerned, they appear to be motivated not only
by constraint of “neutral principles” of law, but also by a belief that anti-Chinese policy
was wise and, perhaps essential. Again, that Harlan was not perfect certainly does not
mean that he was not good. It does mean that the legal doctrine he advanced should be
regarded as a museum piece, not a blueprint.
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Appendix 1

Rank of Justices by Percentage of Votes in Favor of Civil Rights, African American
Cases:
(E.g., 100% of Justice Hughes’ votes supported civil rights)
1. Hughes
2. Lamar, J.
3. VanDevanter
4. Hunt
5. Strong
6. Swayne
7. Bradley
8. Harlan
9. Woods
10. Miller
11. Matthews
12. Day
13. Blatchford
14. Waite
Court as a whole:
15. Brown
16. McKenna
17. Brewer
18. Holmes
19. Clifford
20. Gray
21. White. E.
22. Fuller
23. Peckham
24. Shiras
25. Field
26. Jackson
27. Lamar, L.
28. Lurton
29. Moody
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100
100
100
50
50
50
46.15
45.45
42.86
41.67
40
36.36
28.57
27.27
24.44
20.83
20.83
19.35
18.18
16.67
16.67
15.63
15.15
14.81
10
5.26
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

[1/1]
[1/1]
[1/1]
[3/6]
[2/4]
[2/4]
[6/13]
[20/44]
[3/7]
[5/12]
[2/5]
[8/22]
[2/7]
[3/11]
[11/45]
[5/24]
[5/24]
[6/31]
[4/22]
[1/6]
[3/18]
[5/32]
[5/33]
[4/27]
[1/10]
[1/19]
[0/1]
[0/2]
[0/1]
[0/5]
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Appendix 2
Rank of Justices by Votes in Favor of African American Civil Rights, as a
Percentage of Decisions in Favor of Civil Rights by the Majority in Such Cases.
(E.g., Justice Harlan voted in favor of civil rights 20 times, 182% as often as the 11
times the majority did in the cases upon which he sat.)
1. Harlan
2. Brown
3. Day
4. Brewer
5. Bradley
6. Blatchford
7. Fuller
8. Hughes
9. Hunt
10. Jackson
11. Lamar, J.
12. Lamar, L.
13. Matthews
14. Miller
15. Moody
16. Shiras
17. Strong
18. Swayne
19. VanDevanter
20. Woods
21. McKenna
22. White
23. Peckham
24. Holmes
25. Gray
26. Waite
27. Clifford
28. Field
29. Lurton
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182
167
160
120
120
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
83
83
80
80
75
60
33
20
0

[20/11]
[5/3]
[8/5]
[6/5]
[6/5]
[2/2]
[5/5]
[1/1]
[3/3]
[0/0]
[1/1]
[0/0]
[2/2]
[5/5]
[0/0]
[1/1]
[2/2]
[2/2]
[1/1]
[3/3]
[5/6]
[5/6]
[4/5]
[4/5]
[3/4]
[3/5]
[1/3]
[1/5]
[0/1]
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Appendix 3

Rank of Justices by Frequency of Dissents For (Against) African American Civil
Rights.
(E.g., one out of every 4.89 of Justice Harlan’s votes was a dissent in favor of African
American civil rights.)
1. Harlan
2. Day
3. Brown
4. Bradley
5. Brewer
Court as a whole:
6. Blatchford
7. Fuller
8. Hughes
9. Hunt
10. Jackson
11. Lamar, J.
12. Lamar, L.
13. Matthews
14. Miller
15. Moody
16. Shiras
17. Strong
18. Swayne
19. VanDevanter
20. Woods
21. White
22. Peckham
23. McKenna
24. Holmes
25. Gray
26. Waite
27. Field
28. Clifford
29. Lurton
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1/4.89 [9/44]
1/7.33 [3/22]
1/12
[2/24]
1/13
1/31
1/196.5 [393 total votes; 16 dissenting votes for, less 14
against]
0/7
0/33
0/1
0/7
0/1
0/1
0/2
0/5
0/12
0/5
0/10
0/4
0/4
0/1
0/7
(1/32)
(1/27)
(1/24)
(1/22)
(1/18)
(1/5.5) [2/11]
(1/4.75) [4/19]
(1/3) [2/6]
(1/1)
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Appendix 4
Rank of Justices by Frequency of Dissents For (Against) African American Civil
Rights Compared to Votes with Majority Against Civil Rights
(E.g., Justice Harlan dissented from a majority decision against civil rights once for
every 2.67 he joined a majority decision against civil rights.)
1. Harlan
2. Day
3. Bradley
4. Brown
5. Brewer
6. Blatchford
7. Fuller
8. Hughes
9. Hunt
10. Jackson
11. Lamar, J.
12. Lamar, L.
13. Matthews
14. Miller
15. Moody
16. Shiras
17. Strong
18. Swayne
19. VanDevanter
20. Woods
21. White
22. Peckham
23. McKenna
24. Holmes
25. Gray
26. Field
27. Waite
28. Clifford
29. Lurton
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1/2.67
1/4.67
1/7
1/9.5
1/25
0/5
0/28
0/0
0/3
0/1
0/0
0/2
0/3
0/7
0/5
0/9
0/2
0/2
0/0
0/4
(1/26)
(1/22)
(1/18)
(1/17)
(1/14)
(1/3.5)
(1/3)
(1/1.5)
(1/0)

[9/24]
[3/14]
[2/19]

[4/14]
[2/6]
[2/3]
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Appendix 5

Rank of Justices by Percentage of Votes in Favor of Civil Rights, Asian American
Cases:
(E.g., 84.21% of Justice Peckham’s votes were in favor of Asian American civil
rights.)
1. Peckham
2. Brewer
3. Moody
4. Day
5. Matthews
6. Waite
7. Holmes
8. Gray
9. White
10. Blatchford
11. Woods
12. McKenna
Court as a whole
13. Harlan
14. Shiras
15. Fuller
16. Miller
17. Field
18. Brown
19. Bradley
20. Lamar, L.
21. Jackson
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84.21
70.37
66.67
44.44
37.5
37.5
33.33
30.43
30
29.41
28.57
27.78
27.03
25
25
24.14
22.22
21.05
20
13.3
11.11
0.0

[16/19]
[19/27]
[2/3]
[4/9]
[3/8]
[3/8]
[3/9]
[7/23]
[6/20]
[5/17]
[2/7]
[5/18]
[10/37]
[9/36]
[3/12]
[7/29]
[2/9]
[4/19]
[5/25]
[2/15]
[1/9]
[0/2]
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Appendix 6
Rank of Justices by Votes in Favor of Asian American Civil Rights as a Percentage
of Decisions in Favor of Civil Rights by the Majority in Such Cases.
(E.g., Justice Brewer voted in favor of Asian American civil rights 19 times, 317% as
often as the six times the majority did in the cases upon which he sat.)
1. Brewer
2. Peckham
3. Day
4. Blatchford
5. Brown
6. Fuller
7. Gray
8. Holmes
9. Jackson
10. Matthews
11. McKenna
12. Miller
13. Moody
14. Shiras
15. Waite
16. White
17. Woods
18. Harlan
19. Field
20. Bradley
21. Lamar, L.
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317
267
133
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
90
80
75
50

[19/6]
[16/6]
[4/3]
[5/5]
[5/5]
[7/7]
[7/7]
[3/3]
[0/0]
[3/3]
[5/5]
[2/2]
[2/2]
[3/3]
[3/3]
[6/6]
[2/2]
[9/10]
[4/5]
[2/3]
[½]
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Appendix 7

Rank of Justices by Frequency of Dissents For (Against) Asian American Civil
Rights
(E.g., one out of every 1.9 of Justice Peckham’s votes was a dissent in favor of Asian
American civil rights.)
1. Peckham
2. Brewer
3. Day
Court as a whole:
4. Blatchford
5. Brown
6. Fuller
7. Gray
8. Holmes
9. Jackson
10. Matthews
11. McKenna
12. Miller
13. Moody
14. Shiras
15. Waite
16. White
17. Woods
18. Harlan
19. Field
20. Bradley
21. Lamar, L.
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1/1.9 [10/19]
1/2.08 [13/27]
1/9
1/16.2 [324 total votes; 28 dissenting votes for, less 8
against]
0/17
0/25
0/29 [one dissenting vote for, less one dissenting vote
against]
0/23
0/9
0/2
0/8
0/18
0/9
0/3
0/12
0/8
0/20
0/7
(1/36) [two dissenting votes against, less one dissenting vote
for]
(1/18) [three dissenting votes against, less two dissenting
votes for]
(1/15)
(1/9)
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Appendix 8
Rank of Justices by Frequency of Dissents For (Against) Asian American Civil
Rights Compared to Votes with Majority Against Civil Rights.
(E.g., Justice Peckham dissented 3.33 times from a majority decision against Asian
American civil rights for every time he joined a majority decision against civil rights.)
1. Peckham
2. Brewer
3. Day
4. Blatchford
5. Brown
6. Fuller
7. Gray
8. Holmes
9. Jackson
10. Matthews
11. McKenna
12. Miller
13. Moody
14. Shiras
15. Waite
16. White
17. Woods
18. Harlan
19. Bradley
20. Field
21. Lamar, L.
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3.33/1 [10/3]
1.63/1 [13/8]
1/5
0/12
0/20
0/21 [one dissenting vote against, less one dissenting vote
for]
0/16
0/6
0/2
0/5
0/13
0/7
0/1
0/9
0/5
0/14
0/5
(1/25) [two dissenting votes against, less one dissenting vote
for]
(1/12)
(1/12) [three dissenting votes against, less two dissenting
votes for]
(1/7)
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